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Abstract: During summer 2018, the Nordic system’s kinetic energy dropped below a critical level. As a consequence, Svenska
kraftnät, the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO), requested the largest production unit to reduce its power output to
guarantee system’s security. This action resulted in a deviation from the generation dispatch determined by the market and in high
costs for the Nordic TSOs. In this regard, this paper presents a tool for comparing mitigation strategies from an economic point of
view and evaluates potential economic benefits of utilizing the Emergency Power Control (EPC) functionality of HVDC lines for
the provision of fast reserves as a compliment to Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR). Moreover, the analysis is extended to
the years 2020 and 2025 using inertia estimations from the Nordic TSOs. The findings of the paper suggest that the frequency of
redispatching actions will increase in the future and that the cost of security for Nordic TSOs could be reduced by 70% if HVDC
links are used for frequency support.
1 Introduction
As governments across the world are planning to limit greenhouse
gas emissions, the penetration of renewable energy sources has sig-
nificantly increased in the last years. During the last decade, the total
installed wind power capacity has increased from 159 to 651 GW on
a global level. In 2019, the global offshore wind industry had a record
year with 6.1 GW of new additions. Denmark alone counted as 6% of
the new installed capacity, and forecasts show that investments will
not stop here [1]. On the one hand, this process represents the first
step towards cleaner electricity systems; on the other hand, it causes a
shift from synchronous to inverter-based non-synchronous generation,
resulting in lower system kinetic energy and reduced power systems
robustness to grid disturbances.
Electrical systems are built to continuously match the supply of
electricity to customer demand: any mismatch results in a deviation
of the frequency from its nominal value (50 Hz in Europe). Small
frequency deviations are common during normal operation, mainly
caused by load volatility and intermittent renewable generation. To
distinguish between normal frequency fluctuation and deviations
caused by large imbalances, Transmission System Operators (TSOs)
define security thresholds and activate different balancing resources
depending on the size of the power deviation.
In the Nordic region (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland),
also referred to as Nordic Synchronous Area (NSA), normal system
operation has a standard range of ±100 mHz and Frequency Contain-
ment Reserves for Normal operation (FCR-N) are deployed to keep
frequency within the normal band [2]. When frequency drops below
49.9 Hz, FCR for Disturbances (FCR-D) are activated to mitigate
the impact of the disturbance and stabilize the frequency, while Fre-
quency Restoration Reserves (FRR) are used to restore the frequency
back to the nominal value. The maximum acceptable Instantaneous
Frequency Deviation (IFD) is 1’000 mHz and, in case frequency
drops below 48.8 Hz, loads are shed to avoid total system blackout
[3].
The IFD that follows a disturbance depends on the size of the
power deviation, on the activation speed of reserves and on the kinetic
energy of the system (system inertia). Indeed, kinetic energy stored in
the rotating mass of the system opposes changes in frequency after a
disturbance and represents the first inherent containment reserve. Due
to the replacement of conventional generation with RES, the system’s
kinetic energy is decreasing, leaving the system more prone to high
Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) and larger IFD [4].
The methodology for calculating the FCR-D requirement consists
in a probabilistic approach which aims at reducing the probability of
insufficient reserves, based on different generation, load and inertia
patterns [5]. The considered dimensioning incidents (DI) are the loss
of critical components of the system, such as large generators, demand
facilities and transmission lines. On the one hand, a probabilistic
approach ensures that reserves are procured in a cost-efficient way by
weighting different system conditions with the related probabilities;
on the other hand, the dependence of this calculation on system’s
inertia might result in insufficient FCR-D dynamic response during
low inertia periods. Given the ongoing displacement of synchronous
generation, this is raising concerns among TSOs.
Currently, the dimensioning incident in the NSA is the loss of
Oskarshamn 3 (O3), a 1’450 MW nuclear power plant in Sweden
(located in the bidding zone SE3) operated by Oskarshamn Kraft-
grupp (OKG) [6]. The method and the results presented in [7] show
that, with the current FCR-D requirement, the maximum IFD is
exceeded when the Nordic kinetic energy drops below a certain thresh-
old (around 150 GWs with the current dimensioning incident), unless
mitigation measures are taken. This has already happened three times
in 2018 (June 23-25, July 6-9 and August 11-12) [8]. During these
three periods, the loss of O3 would have caused an IFD greater than
1’000 mHz, violating the N-1 stability criterion.
To avoid this risk, the Swedish TSO (Svenska kraftnät - Svk)
ordered OKG to reduce its power output by 100 MW. TSOs are
responsible for safe operation of power systems and can give orders
to market participants at any market stage (real-time, intra-day, day-1,
day-2, day-x) if the system security is in danger. However, this oper-
ation comes with high cost, since the affected producers should be
compensated for the incurred costs and the substitute power must be
procured outside the market operation [9]. This mitigation strategy
falls in the category of preventive actions, which aim at eliminat-
ing causes of potential dangerous situations before these happen
[10]. The following question arises: are there more cost-efficient
options which guarantee safe operation while avoiding expensive
redispatching actions?
Decrease of kinetic energy in modern power systems is becoming
a common experience of system operators around the world. The first
cases date back to 2010 in Ireland, where the Irish system operators
(EirGrid and SONI) identified high RoCoF values as potential secu-
rity problems [11]. In the following years, similar situations were
experienced in other small islands, such as Cyprus, Hawaii and New
Zealand [12–14]. More recently, the same problems have reached
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larger islands, such us Great Britain and Australia, where large part
of the electricity demand is supplied by renewable sources [15, 16].
Although large interconnected systems have not experienced such
situations yet, many system operators, California Independent Sys-
tem Operator (CAISO) and Electricity Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) among others, have performed analyses to calculate the
maximum amount of RES their systems can accommodate with-
out experiencing such problems [17–19]. As more and more system
operators are facing these challenges, many technical and regulatory
solutions have been proposed in the literature. In [20], the authors
compare different mitigation approaches from a technical point of
view, raging from synthetic inertia to more complex control strategies.
They also analyze what could be the impact of regulatory measures
such as new market constraints, demand side inclusion and adaptive
protection schemes. The situation of Ireland is analyzed in [21–23];
in particular, authors in [21] compare three mitigation strategies -
RoCoF relay setting relaxation, minimum inertia level in the mar-
ket and provision of synthetic inertia - with dynamic simulations,
conveying that relaxing the settings of RoCoF relays has the most
influence in minimizing the risk of frequency instability. Similar stud-
ies have been carried out also for the UK, showing that with the
current requirements for FCR the frequency nadir and RoCoF exceed
respectively 49.0 Hz and 0.125 Hz/s [24, 25].
Besides conventional generators, frequency support can be pro-
vided by other components capable of injecting active power into the
grid, e.g. High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) lines. According to
[26], the control scheme of all HVDC converters must be capable
of operating in frequency sensitive mode, i.e. the transmitted power
is adjusted in response to a frequency deviation. For this reason, an
HVDC link connecting asynchronous areas can be used as a vehicle
for FCR-D: to limit the IFD in case of a disturbance, the necessary
active power can be imported from the neighboring system in the
form of Emergency Power Control (EPC). Given the high number
of interconnections formed by HVDC lines between NSA and the
neighboring areas (see Fig 1) and the introduction in the Nordic mar-
ket of a new FFR product expected by summer 2020, this corrective
action could represent a valid alternative to expensive preventive redis-
patching. The current EPC activation method is based on step-wise
triggers: when the frequency drops below a certain threshold, a con-
stant amount of power is injected through the HVDC link, depending
on the level of inertia. Although already implemented [9], HVDC
EPC is currently not in use.
The utilization of HVDC interconnectors for frequency support
has been largely investigated from a technical point of view [27–32];
however, limited work has been done on the evaluation of the related
economic benefits. The goal of this paper is to investigate what is the
cost of using HVDC interconnectors for the provision of frequency
support, and to provide a decision-making support tool for deciding
how to act in case of low inertia situations, comparing different
mitigation strategies with the associated costs. The analysis is carried
out for three scenarios (2018, 2020, 2025), using historical data
from Nord Pool (2018), and inertia estimates from the Nordic TSOs
(2020-2025). The cost of the remedial actions are calculated based
on historical data from the past 5 years, considering the distribution
of the average price obtained via data re-sampling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief overview of the Nordic power system. Section 3 introduces
the decision-making support tool and which data is used for the three
different scenarios. Section 4 presents the under frequency regres-
sion model used to determine the IFD based on the kinetic energy
of the system. Section 5 describes in detail the current paradigm
and the alternative remedial action, focusing on some technical con-
siderations related to these two measures. Section 6 introduces the
market considerations and price scenarios used for the calculation
of the related costs. Section 7 presents the cost saving analyses and
Section 8 concludes.
2 Nordic Synchronous Area
A synchronous area (SA), also referred to as regional group, is a
group of power systems that are connected and operate under the
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Fig. 1: Synchronous areas, HVDC interconnections and dimension-
ing incident (Oskarshamn 3) [33], [34]. Dashed lines are expected to
be operational by 2025.
same frequency. In Europe, there are five main synchronous areas
[34]:
• Continental Europe SA;
• Nordic SA;
• Baltic SA;
• British SA;
• Ireland/Northern Ireland SA.
The system of interest âA˘S¸ Nordic SA, or NSA âA˘S¸ consists of
four countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland and East Denmark (see
Fig 1). West Denmark is synchronously connected to Germany, thus
belongs to Continental Europe SA. The generation mix in the Nordic
countries can be found in the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform [35].
Almost half of the generation in East Denmark comes from renew-
able sources (onshore and offshore wind, solar, biomass and waste),
while the remaining is fossil fuel based (natural gas, coal and oil). In
Norway, more than 90% of electricity is produced by hydro power
plants. Hydro power plants contribute to half of the generation in
Sweden as well, the remaining capacity is divided between nuclear
power plants, wind farms and oil-fired thermal units. In Finland the
generation mix is more heterogeneous; half of the Finnish electrical
energy is produced by nuclear power plants and coal-based thermal
units.
The grand total installed generation capacity was 91.66 GW in
2018, and it has gradually increased to 97.2 GW in the last two years.
Overall, the region is water resource rich, hence majority (about 50%)
of electricity production comes from hydro power plants. The second
source of generation is thermal (about 20%) and nuclear comes third
(about 12%). The penetration of RES has gradually increased from
11.1 GW (12%) in 2018 to 14.5 GW (15%) in 2020, as Sweden and
Norway are installing a large number of onshore wind turbines. The
total demand ranges from 26.4 to 60.1 GW, with the minimum and
the maximum respectively during summer and winter. With a similar
trend, the total system kinetic energy ranges from 100 to 300 GWs.
Based on the system data, NSA is comparable to the British SA
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and it is not immune to high frequency deviations during low-inertia
operation.
In terms of interconnections to neighboring asynchronous areas,
NSA is connected to Continental Europe SA through seven HVDC
links: NorNed (Norway-Netherlands, 700 MW), Skagerrak (Norway-
West Denmark, 1’632 MW), KontiSkan (Sweden-West Denmark,
720 MW), Storebælt (West Denmark-East Denmark, 600 MW),
Kontek (East Denmark-Germany, 600 MW), Baltic cable (Sweden-
Germany, 600 MW) and SwePol (Sweden-Poland, 600 MW). In
addition, Kriegers Flak (Combined Grid Solution) will provide con-
nection between East Denmark and Germany starting from August
2020 (AC cable and back-to-back HVDC converter, 400 MW), inte-
grating offshore wind farms along its path. Finally, three other HVDC
links connect NSA to Baltic SA: NordBalt (Sweden-Lithuania),
Estlink (Finland-Estonia) and Vyborg HVDC (Finland-Russia).
2.1 Future Scenarios
As mentioned in several Nordic TSOs reports [9, 36], the Nordic
power system is undergoing substantial changes. The main drivers
are climate policies, which in turn stimulate the development of more
Renewable Energy Sources (RES), technological developments, and
a common European framework for markets, operation and planning.
As a consequence, the following events are expected in the next years
[36]:
• Closure of fossil-fuelled thermal power plants and reduction of
CHP plants;
• Installation of a large amount of wind power capacity to meet
political agreements;
• Decommissioning of Swedish nuclear power plants and con-
struction of new nuclear power plants in Finland;
• Construction of new HVDC interconnectors between NSA and
neighboring areas.
In order to assess the impact of the ongoing and foreseen changes on
the kinetic energy of the system, future market scenarios have been
defined by the Nordic TSOs. In [9], a scenario for 2025 is presented:
the scenario is constructed as a best-estimate scenario, i.e. it describes
the market development that is considered most probable.
In brief, the grand total installed generation capacity is expected
to increase by 6.2 GW. The new capacity from RES is expected to
be 8.44 GW, of which 6.72 GW of wind power, while the closure of
fossil-fuelled thermal units will decrease synchronous generation by
2.24 GW. The demand is expected to increase by 6%, mainly due to
growing population and electrification of vehicles and railroads.
In terms of new connections, three HVDC links are expected to
become operational between 2020 and 2025 (dashed lines in Fig 1):
North Sea Link (Norway-UK, 1’400 MW) and Nord Link (Norway-
Germany, 1’400 MW) in 2021 and Hansa PowerBridge (Sweden-
Germany, 700 MW) in 2025 [36].
3 Decision-Making Support Tool
The ongoing decrease of system inertia is classified as one of the
major future challenges for the Nordic Power System [36]. For this
reason, all Nordic TSOs (Energinet - Denmark, Svenska kraftnät -
Sweden, Statnett - Norway, and Fingrid - Finland) have implemented
in their SCADA systems an online tool for estimating the inertia of
the system and the corresponding maximum IFD [9]. These tools are
used to estimate the inertia level, and the corresponding maximum
IFD, from seven to one day before operation based on production
plans; however, they can be used also for forecasting future inertia
levels based on market simulations.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm which extends these
online-estimation tools. First, the inertia level of the system and
the corresponding IFD are estimated. If the frequency limits and N-1
security criterion are violated, different mitigation strategies are then
compared, both from a technical and an economic point of view. The
flow chart of the proposed method is depicted in Fig 2.
Input 1, ... , input n
Simulation time
Inertia estimation
Frequency Response
Model
IFD > IFDmax
...
Mitigation
Strategy
1
Mitigation
Strategy
m
Cost
assumptions
Cost comparison
Decision
System status
analysis
Estimation of
maximum IFD
Mitigation strategies:
Technical analysis
Mitigation strategies:
Economic analysis
TRUE
FALSE
Fig. 2: Sequence diagram of the algorithm comparing different
mitigation strategies.
The first block relates to the estimation of system inertia. This
calculation is performed considering which units are online, or will
be online. There could be different input for this, such as hourly pro-
duction values from power exchanges, production measurements per
production type, measurements of power plants, status of generators’
circuit breaker, and so on. The length of the simulation period and the
time resolution are also defined at this stage, meaning that the analysis
can be performed for the next hour, but also for longer periods (e.g.
an entire year) with hourly, or longer, time resolution.
The second block corresponds to the estimation of the maximum
IFD. For this calculation, the frequency response model of the system
under investigation is used. This can be a dynamic, e.g. single- or
multi-machine equivalent, or a statistical model. The input to this
block is the frequency of the system, the reference incident and the
inertia estimates (the kinetic energy reduction due to the reference
incident can be considered as well).
Once the maximum IFD is calculated with the desired time reso-
lution, these values are compared to the maximum allowed IFD of
the system. If the requirements are not violated, then there is no need
for further analyses and the algorithm goes directly to the conclu-
sion; otherwise, different mitigation strategies are compared in the
following blocks.
A large variety of mitigation strategies can be applied in order to
guarantee N-1 security in low-inertia situations [9, 20]. Depending
on the inertia level of the system, the entity of these actions could
vary significantly. The scope of the technical analysis is to calcu-
late the entity of each action, e.g. how much the reference incident
should be reduced, or how much extra support to FCR-D is necessary.
This calculation is normally performed and validated with dynamic
simulations.
After the technical analysis has been performed, the cost of each
strategy is calculated taking into consideration the different market
stages where these actions are performed. The input to this blocks are
different market considerations and the expected evolution of prices
in the upcoming period. Once the costs are calculated, it is possible
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to compare the analyzed strategies from an economic point of view
and choose the one which results in least costs.
In this paper, the cost saving analysis starts with the events of
2018, and continues with two scenarios for the years 2020 and 2025.
As power system data is considered sensitive by Nordic TSOs, the
comparison of the two remedial actions considered in this paper varies
across scenarios based on the availability of data. The three scenarios
and the corresponding data are further described in this section.
3.1 Summer 2018
During Summer 2018, the inertia of the Nordic System dropped
below the safety level three times. The length of the periods and the
limitations on the largest unit, O3, have been communicated by Svk
through Urgent Market Messages (UMM) in the Nord Pool Online
Platform [8]. The three periods are:
– June 23-25: duration 50 hours, dimensioning incident reduced
by 100 MW;
– July 6-9: duration 75 hours, dimensioning incident reduced by
100 MW;
– August 11-12: duration 41 hours, dimensioning incident reduced
by 100 MW.
During these periods, the kinetic energy of the system was not
always below the security threshold; however, for security reasons
and technical limitations (ramping limits and costs), the output of O3
was reduced for the entire length of these periods. As the duration
of these events and the entities of the reduction are known, only the
comparison of the two remedial action is performed for this scenario
(thus starting directly from the technical analysis).
3.2 Scenarios 2020 and 2025
The kinetic energy stored in the system, Ek, is proportional to the
rated apparent power of synchronous generators connected to the grid,
S, and their inertia constants, H:
Ek =
N∑
i=1
HiSi (1)
Thus, in order to estimate the kinetic energy in the system, it is neces-
sary to know which generating units will be online. To this end, Svk
has performed a large number of market simulations for the upcoming
years [37, 38]. The resulting market outcomes, i.e. the production
of generating units and the flows over HVDC interconnectors, have
been used to estimate the inertia level of the system for these years.
The market simulations are carried out using the EFI’s Multi-area
Power-market Simulator (EMPS) with the SAMLAST functional-
ity [9]. The EMPS model is a market simulation tool, designed for
power systems with high shares of hydro power plants, which com-
prises a strategy evaluation and a system simulation part [39]. The
strategy evaluation consists in the calculation of incremental water
values (marginal costs for hydro power) for each area using stochastic
dynamic programming. These values are then used in the simula-
tion part, where an optimization problem is solved to determine the
production of hydro and thermal power plants. The generators dis-
patch is then analyzed with the SAMLAST program, which performs
load-flow analyses using detailed grid models [40]. If grid constraints
are violated, SAMLAST reduces the available transmission capac-
ities between areas and update the optimization problem with the
new capacities. In principle, the final solution will coincide with the
outcome of a well-functioning electricity market.
The market model used for the simulation comprises more than
1’200 hydro power plants and all thermal units with capacity greater
than 100 MW [9]. The countries included in the model are Sweden,
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, while the
neighboring countries (Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and the UK)
are described with fixed prices [9]. For the 2020 scenario, revisions of
nuclear power plants is taken into consideration [41–43]; since these
events are scheduled 2 years in advance, they are not accounted for in
the 2025 scenario. Instead, two different scenarios are considered for
the year 2025 based on the decommission of nuclear power plants:
1. 2025 - Full nuclear (FN): market simulations based on the current
situation, with nuclear power plants fully dispatched.
2. 2025 - Half nuclear (HN): market simulations with half of the
nuclear production replaced by wind and solar production and
HVDC imports (all inverter-based generation).
These scenarios are further described in a previous report from
ENTSO-E [44], and comprise the foreseen changes introduced in
Section 2.1, i.e. estimations on future wind power installed capacity,
information on synchronous generation plants decommission and new
HVDC interconnections.
As there is a strong correlation between weather conditions and
system inertia, e.g. in dry periods with low rainfall the production
of hydro power plants is replaced by HVDC imports leading to low
inertia levels [36], the weather conditions assumed for 2020 and 2025
highly impact the results. In order to capture a greater variation of
possible conditions, the simulations are performed using historical
meteorological data of the years between 1980 and 2012. Each simu-
lation is run for a time-series corresponding to the whole year with a
resolution of 3 hours [9].
The validation of the market model was performed comparing
the outcome of the simulation for the year 2014 with the actual data
[9]. In general, the model captures the seasonal behaviour of gener-
ation of both hydro and thermal units, whit some minor errors. For
example, the production of thermal plants is underestimated during
summer because the model does not comprise start-up costs and
reserve requirements, which results in thermal units to stop producing
for short periods.
The outcome of the market simulations is then used to estimate the
kinetic energy in the system. For each time instance, the kinetic energy
is calculated by summing the product of the inertia constant and the
rated apparent power of all online synchronous generators. Most of
the inertia constants and rated apparent powers of synchronous units
are available from the Nordic grid model datasets, for the others aver-
age inertia constants have been used. For those generators modules
with more than one unit, the capacity of already online units is fully
utilized before considering online other units.
The results of the simulated hydrological years have been con-
densed into three cases:
1. Low-inertia: dry hydrological year, resulting in low inertia;
2. Medium-inertia: average hydrological year, resulting in average
inertia;
3. High-inertia: wet hydrological year, resulting in high inertia.
The calculated values of kinetic energy are then given as input to
the frequency response model, which is explain in details in the next
section.
4 Frequency Response Model
The goal of kinetic energy estimation is to verify that the N-1 criterion
is satisfied, that is to confirm that the loss of the dimensioning incident
would not lead to an IFD greater than the maximum allowance. In the
following, the relation between system inertia and IFD is presented,
together with the statistical model used for the analyses presented in
this paper.
As mentioned above, IFD depends on power deviation, system
inertia and activation speed of reserves. Assuming that generators
swing coherently and neglecting the frequency dependency of the
load, the system dynamics can be modeled by a single machine
equivalent and its behavior can be expressed using the normalized
swing equation [45]:
2H
dωr
dt
= Pm − Pe (2)
where H is the inertia constant of the system, ωr is the generator
speed and Pm, Pe are respectively the mechanical and electrical
4
power of the system. The aggregate system inertia H can be related
to the kinetic energy Ek with the following expression:
H =
Ek
Sn
(3)
where Sn is the system’s base power. In such a reduced system, the
rotor speed ωr of the single machine equivalent is directly related to
the system frequency f :
ωr =
2pif
2pif0
(4)
where f0 is the nominal system frequency. RoCoF can be obtained
by plugging Eq. (3) and (4) into Eq. (2):
df
dt
=
f0
2Ek
∆P (5)
where ∆P = (Pm − Pe)Sn is the mismatch between mechanical
and electrical power. An expression of the IFD, ∆f , can be derived
by taking the Laplace transform of Eq. (5):
∆f =
f0
2s
∆P
Ek
. (6)
The single machine equivalent described above can be extended
including primary frequency reserves. The IFD is then expressed as
in [7]:
∆f =
f0
2
s+
RF (s)f0
2Ek
∆P
Ek
(7)
with F (s) the transfer function of primary reserves, describing the
dynamics of governor and turbine, and R the regulating strength in
MW/Hz.
Eq. (7) shows the strong correlation between RoCoF and IFD.
With the assumption that the ratio between regulating strength and
kinetic energy is constant for a system with high regulating strength,
the authors in [7] approximate Eq. (7) using a linear regression model.
The regressions are expressed as:
∆fover ≈ αover ∆P
Ek
+ βover (8)
∆funder ≈ αunder ∆PEk
+ βunder (9)
with the assumption that the transfer function of primary reserves is
not the same for under and over frequency events.
The regression analysis was carried out using respectively 19
and 26 disturbance events (occurred in the period between October
2015 and September 2016 in the Nordic system) for under and over
frequency deviation, under the assumption that FCR-N were fully
activated (frequency deviations start at 49.9 Hz) and provided similar
response during each disturbance. Fig 3 shows the 19 disturbances
used to determine the under frequency regression model. The model
was then validated using historical disturbances from October 2016
to September 2017, with the resulting standard deviation equal to
0.035 Hz and 0.048 Hz for under and over frequency response. This
regression model is currently the most accurate model for estimating
the IFD based on the kinetic energy in the NSA and it is used in Nordic
TSOs’ control rooms to investigate frequency instability problems
[9].
The regression model is used in this work to determine the IFD
for the 2020 and 2025 scenarios, using the kinetic energy estimations
from the above mentioned market simulations. For each instance,
the kinetic energy estimate is given as an input to the linear regres-
sion model (Eq. (9), with αunder = 0.0757 and βunder = 0.0369),
which returns the corresponding IFD. The IFD is then compared to
the maximum allowed IFD. According to current TSOs practice, a
safety margin of 0.05 Hz is kept and the maximum allowed IFD is
950 mHz. If the IFD is below this value, then the N-1 criterion is
satisfied and no redispatch is necessary, so the algorithm moves to the
next instance. When the IFD is greater than 950 mHz, the algorithm
proceeds to compare the differnet mitigation strategies considered.
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Fig. 3: Maximum instantaneous frequency deviation relative to
the ratio between power imbalance and kinetic energy of the
under-frequency regression disturbances in [7].
5 Remedial Actions: Technical Considerations
Remedial actions are defined as the set of measures applied by TSOs
to maintain operational security and relieve congestions. According
to the Network Code on System Operation [10], remedial actions can
be divided into:
– Preventive actions: measures applied in operational planning or
scheduling stage to prevent dangerous situations and maintain
system security in the coming operational situation.
– Corrective actions: measures implemented immediately or
relatively soon after an occurrence of a contingency.
In this paper we consider two remedial actions taken to meet the
maximum allowed IFD during low inertia periods, fulfilling the N-
1 security criterion. This section starts with the explanation of the
current paradigm, the preventive reduction of O3 followed by upward
regulation of reserves. We then investigate an alternative corrective
action where HVDC contributes to frequency stability.
5.1 Current Paradigm - DI Reduction
The current practice in case of low inertia periods is the preventive
reduction of the dimensioning incident, i.e. the largest production unit,
O3. For example, if the maximum disconnected power the system
can handle is 1’300 MW, the power output of O3 is reduced by 150
MW.
According to TSOs’ current practice, the dimensioning incident
is usually reduced by blocks of 50 MW. Moreover, a certain security
margin is kept and the redispatch is performed few hours before
and after the low-inertia event. Due to technical limitations, nuclear
units might need few hours to ramp down (normally 8 hours) and,
depending on the length of the reduction period, they might take from
6 to 72 hours to get back to their nominal power output (for example,
if the limitation is performed for up to 80% of the operational period,
the output cannot be increased for the remaining time) [9]. For these
reasons, if the frequency limits are exceeded twice (or more) within
36 hours, the dimensioning incident is reduced for the whole period
(and the maximum reduction is applied).
Fig 4 shows the power limitation on O3 (orange plot) depending
on the level of inertia. These values are obtain through dynamic
simulations using a single machine equivalent model of the Nordic
power system. The parameters of the model are tuned based on the
frequency response of the system to some real disturbances happened
in the Nordic system. The model has been validated and is currently
used by Nordic TSOs in their control rooms. For this analysis, the
reference incident is applied with varying system inertia and the
IFD is calculated. The model considers that FCR-N are already fully
activated and the frequency deviation is calculated starting from
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Fig. 4: Required DI reduction and injected power by HVDC EPC,
respectively, to maintain the N-1 security criterion in the Nordic
system with low inertia.
49.9 Hz. With an IFD greater than 0.9 Hz, the reference incident is
decreased until the frequency limits are not exceeded anymore.
5.2 HVDC Emergency Power Control
This remedial action relies on the fact that HVDC converters,
equipped with fast frequency controllers, can adjust the power flow
in response to frequency deviations. In the Nordic countries, this
control mode is referred to as Emergency Power Control (EPC). This
measure falls in the category of corrective actions: in low inertia
periods, although the dimensioning incident would lead to an IFD
greater than 1 Hz, the output of O3 is not reduced in advance. In
case the dimensioning incident occurs, EPC is immediately activated
and the power necessary to keep the frequency within the limits is
injected through HVDC.
Different control strategies can be used to define the response of
HVDC converters. The currently implemented strategy is based on
step-wise triggers: depending on the size of the power deviation and
the corresponding frequency variation, a constant amount of power is
injected to improve the frequency response of the system. Authors
in [27] presented a new approach based on droop control, where the
power injection varies taking into consideration the actual frequency
response of the system (instead of injecting a fixed amount of power)
to achieve a faster response compared to the current strategy. However,
detailed technical analyses of such control strategies are outside the
scope of this paper and for the comparison of the two remedial actions
the current implemented strategy (step-wise trigger) is considered.
Similar to the analysis done for DI reduction, the necessary power
injected through HVDC links depending on the inertia level of the
system is plotted in Fig 4 (blue plot). The analysis is carried out
with the single machine equivalent model described above. Similar to
the work in [27], the frequency response of the system is analyzed
with varying system inertia: the reference incident is applied and the
frequency nadir is calculated. The contribution of HVDC links to
frequency stability is assessed considering that all HVDC links have
a single-step injection, the same triggering level and the same time
threshold. As pointed out by the authors in [27], the triggering level
has a great impact on the system response: the greater the frequency
dead band, the more power must be injected. Our analysis are carried
out using the frequency dead band values provided in [9]. It is no
surprise that more power shall be injected through HVDC compared
to the reduction of the incident, as the frequency dead band makes
the contribution of HVDC links less effective.
For the cost saving analysis, this remedial action is used only
to contain the frequency within the limit; the frequency restoration
is assumed to use local reserves. In addition, reservation of HVDC
capacity and procurement of reserves for HVDC EPC are only needed
for those hours when the frequency can fall below 49.05 Hz whereas
the reduction of the dimensioning incident would be prolonged for
more hours due to technical limitations. The analysis focuses on four
interconnectors - Kontek (KO), Baltic Cable (BC), NorNed (NN) and
SwePol (SP) - and the injected power is equally shared by the four
links.
6 Remedial Actions: Market Considerations
In this section, the market considerations and price scenarios for the
cost saving analyses are presented.
6.1 Redispatching Costs and Regulating Prices
The downregulation of O3 is considered as a redispatching action.
Normally, redispatch happens after the day-ahead and intra-day mar-
kets have been cleared: this is done to avoid the distortion of the
market outcome. Generators and consumers have to submit their final
dispatch 45 minutes before real time operation; in this time frame,
TSOs check if the actual dispatch violates grid constraints. If this
happens, they downregulate and upregulate some units. In the Nordic
countries, this is done following a market-based approach: gener-
ators and consumers submit their bids for up/down regulation, the
real-time market is cleared and the prices for up/down regulation
are defined [46]. Although each Nordic TSO is responsible for the
real-time power balance in their control zone, there is a common reg-
ulating power market operated by Nord Pool. This is done to reduce
balancing costs and to increase the competition between balancing
responsible entities.
In case of low inertia periods, the security of the system is
considered in danger and a different regulation applies: Svk can
communicate the limitation to OKG at any market stage. When this
measure is used, the producer should receive market compensation
for the costs associated with the power limitation. First, by decreasing
its power output, the producer incurs opportunity costs that are equal
to what they would have received for producing an amount of power
equal to the power reduction. Second, by moving away from the
nominal power output, extra costs are incurred due to lower efficiency
(as a rule of thumb, for nuclear power plants, one can say that half
of the fuel which is not used during the power reduction is lost and
cannot be used later on) [9]. Third, the decrease of power production
of nuclear power plants results in a temperature transient, inducing a
cumulative aging of the unit and increasing the risk of failure [9]. All
these things are taken into consideration by Nordic TSOs and OKG
receives a financial compensation, as stated on a bilateral agreement
between Svk and OKG.
In 2018, low-inertia events were forecast after the day-ahead mar-
ket was cleared, and thus the reduction of O3 was performed similarly
to normal redispatching:
– OKG was compensated for the opportunity cost of not producing
100 MW (the compensation was equal to 49 SEK/MWh - approx.
4.64 e/MWh);
– OKG was compensated for reduced efficiency and other costs
associated with the power limitation (fixed amount equal to
50’000 SEK - approx. 4’740 e);
– The substitute power was procured form other generators in the
regulating market (Nord Pool regulating price e/MWh [47]).
Although there might be some small changes in the bilateral agree-
ment between OKG and Svk (a new version is expected for 2020), we
calculate the financial compensation in the 2020 and 2025 scenarios
using the values from 2018.
Concerning the regulating power prices, all three low-inertia events
in 2018 happened during summer (June to August). Therefore, in all
our scenarios we assume that the redispatching will most probably
occur in the summer period. The distribution of regulating prices for
the last 5 years is shown in Fig 5 (left): prices are calculated as the
average price in the 12 Nordic bidding zones during a specific hour
[47]. Since market forecasts for the year 2020 or 2025 are out of
the scope of this work, reasonable prices are calculated through data
re-sampling. Fig 5 (right) shows the distribution of the average price
6
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
5-
ye
ar
0
20
40
60
80
Pr
ic
e
(e
/M
W
h)
0 2 4 6 8 10
34
35
36
Probability (%)
Fig. 5: Left: Nordic regulating power prices during the summer
period (calculated for every hour as the average price in the 12 bid-
ding zones). Right: distribution of the average price obtained after
data resampling. Blue dashed lines are respectively the 5th and 95th
percentiles, while the red one is the median.
obtained by randomly sampling 2’232 prices out of the 11’160 con-
sidered (this action is repeated 10’000 times). From the distribution,
three price scenarios (high-medium-low) are obtained considering
the 5th, 50th (median) and the 95th percentile. These prices, as well
as the average price for summer 2018, are reported in Table 1.
6.2 HVDC Reservation and FCR Procurement Costs
The utilization of HVDC lines for frequency support relies on the fact
that there is enough transmission capacity available on the HVDC
interconnectors, and that there is a certain availability of frequency
reserves on the neighboring systems. As for now, there seems to be
no regulation about how these can be procured on a market basis. In
order to assess what could be the cost of this remedial action, we
envision a possible future situation where there is a European market
for reserves, and Nordic TSOs are requested to procure the necessary
primary reserves through this platform. In fact, this seems to be the
direction that European countries are taking, as described in [48]
for automatic activated FRR. Moreover, the reservation of HVDC
capacity is assumed to come with a cost. This is considered also in
[9], where they assume there might be a reservation cost for HVDC
in the future.
However, it cannot be excluded that Nordic TSOs might sign an
agreement with neighboring TSOs for the exchange of reserves in
situations where operational security is in danger (or at any time
in order to increase the level of security); this is already happening
among differnet countries in Continental Europe with the Interna-
tional Grid Control Cooperation (IGCC) [49]. Moreover, it is not sure
that HVDC capacity will be reserved at a cost, as there are 100 MW
of available capacity on the considered lines for 70% of the time on a
yearly average [47] or, alternatively, HVDC lines could be overloaded
Table 1 Average prices for 2018 and for the period 2015-2019.
2018 5-year average
5th pct Median 95th pct
Regulating power
(e/MWh) 54.06 34.10 34.60 35.10
FCR procurement
(e/MW)
DE 11.18 9.61 10.78 12.13
NL 19.53 12.15 13.63 15.19
PL 5.34 5.32 5.34 5.36
Congestion rent
(e/MWh)
KO 2.00 5.27 5.59 5.93
BC 11.18 6.60 6.94 7.30
NN 19.53 11.57 11.97 12.39
SP 5.34 10.75 11.31 11.91
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Fig. 6: Distribution of the average price for primary reserves in
Germany, the Netherlands and Poland obtained after data re-sampling.
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Fig. 7: Distribution of the average congestion rent for Kontek, Baltic
Cable, NorNed and SwePol obtained after data re-sampling.
for a short amount of time (in the range of minutes) [50, 51]. Despite
these considerations, the analyses presented in this paper consider
that these services will be provided at a cost.
Regarding FCR procurement prices in Germany, the Netherlands
and Poland, this data can be found in the ENTSO-E Transparency
Platform [52]. Similar to what was done for regulating power prices,
prices corresponding to one summer period were sampled from the
data set of the summer prices of the last 5 years, and three price
scenarios (high-medium-low) were determined using the 5th, 50th
(median) and 95th percentile, shown in Table 1 together with the
average summer prices of 2018. The distribution of the average prices
for these three countries is depicted in Fig 6.
The only source of prices for HVDC capacity is Energinet’s data
platform: the Energi Data Service [53]. In their web page, the yearly
and monthly auction prices for Kontek, the link between Germany
and Denmark (DK2), can be found. However, there is no data for
Baltic Cable, NorNed and SwePol. Since TSOs do not incur direct
costs when reserving transmission capacity, this should be provided at
the opportunity cost of not using it for energy trades in the day-ahead
market. For this reason, in this paper we consider that the price for
reserving HVDC capacity in a specific hour is equal to the congestion
rent (in that hour). Day-ahead spot prices can be found in the ENTSO-
E Transparency Platform. Similar to the other prices, congestion rents
corresponding to one summer period were sampled from the data set
of the last 5 summers. Again, three prices (high-medium-low) were
determined using the 5th, 50th (median) and 95th percentile, shown
in Table 1 together with the average congestion rent of summer 2018.
The distribution of the average prices for these four interconnectors
is depicted in Fig 7. The resulting prices for Kontek were compared
to the actual auction prices, with the calculated prices slightly higher
than the actual ones.
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Fig. 8: Comparison between DI reduction and HVDC EPC for the low inertia events of the 2025 HN scenario (low inertia).
7 Cost Saving Analyses
In this section, the results of the cost saving analyses are presented.
Table 2 and 3 present the results of the algorithm introduced in Section
3, with the hours when the kinetic energy is below the requirement
and the corresponding remedial actions.
The first thing to be noticed is that the occurrence of low inertia
periods is highly impacted by the weather. In terms of hours when the
kinetic energy is expected to be below the requirements, this number
is almost always zero in case of wet hydrological years (high inertia
scenarios). On the contrary, these numbers are tripled in case of
dry years (compared to an average hydrological year). This happens
because during dry periods the production of hydro power plants
(that are synchronous machines) is replaced by imports via HVDC
(which do not contribute to the kinetic energy of the system). The
same trend is observed with the entity of remedial actions ("Energy"
column in Table 2 and 3), as they are proportional to the amount of
hours. Conversely, the number of events does not follow the same
trend: technical limitations play an important role on the length of
DI reduction and, with high frequency of low inertia periods, the
limitation on O3 is often prolonged resulting in less but longer events.
Second, the amount of hours of low inertia periods is expected to
decrease in the next 5 years. This is mainly because of the new HVDC
interconnections, as more transmission capacity means more exports.
Indeed, the high share of hydro power makes Nordic electricity
cheaper than in other countries (e.g. Netherlands or UK). Thus, more
exports mean more synchronous generation. This is even reflected
in the 2025 HN scenario, where low inertia periods with half of the
nuclear capacity are shorter than the ones in 2020.
Lastly, the length of each event differs depending on the remedial
action. For instance, HVDC capacity and UCTE reserves are needed
only for those specific hours when the kinetic energy is below the
requirements, while this is not the case for DI reduction. This can be
visualized in Fig 8, where the two remedial actions are compared.
The cost of reducing the dimensioning incident is provided in
Table 4. In summer 2018, the cost of downregulating O3 is calcu-
lated to be around 90 thousand euros, while the procurement of the
substitute power around 900 thousand euros, resulting in a total cost
Table 2 Low inertia events and DI reduction
Scenario Events Hours (h) Energy (GWh)
2018 3 166 17
2020
High - - -
Medium 8 856 137
Low 11 1’950 392
2025 FN
High - - -
Medium 15 345 48
Low 16 1’020 182
2025 HN
High 1 60 5
Medium 18 649 132
Low 14 1’638 437
of 0.988 million euros. Depending on the type of hydrological year,
future projections suggest that there could be more low-inertia periods
between 2020 and 2025, resulting in considerable higher redispatch
costs. Three different prices have been used for calculating the cost
of procuring the substitute power, based on the historical prices from
2015 to 2019. As the standard deviation of the distribution in Fig 8 is
quite small, the corresponding costs are quite close to each other (for
example, in 2020 - low inertia, costs are in the range of 15.24-15.63
million euros). Thus, for the sake of space, only the results calculated
with the median are displayed. On the contrary, the results vary a lot
across different inertia scenarios: they are equal to or close to zero if
wet years are to be expected, and triple moving from average to dry
years.
For the calculation of costs associated with HVDC EPC, it has been
assumed that Nordic TSOs pays for reserving HVDC capacity and for
procuring reserves on the other systems. This corresponds to the entire
spectrum of costs they could bear for this action. The calculated costs
are presented in Table 5. Also in this case, the difference between
the costs calculated with high and low prices is not big, as the entity
of these remedial actions is significantly smaller than the power
limitations on O3. Therefore, only the results calculated with the
median are displayed also in this case. In 2018, the costs of using
HVDC can be divided into 48 thousand euros for reserving HVDC
capacity and 225 thousand euros for procuring primary reserves in
the three neighboring countries, for a total cost of 273 thousand euros.
Similar to the preventive reduction of O3, these costs highly varies
across inertia scenarios with the peak in the 2025 HN - low inertia
scenario. Once again, these are the maximum expected costs; real
costs will depends on the type of agreement between Nordic and
European TSOs.
Finally, the cost saving comparison between DI reduction and
HVDC EPC is provided in Fig 9 for all the considered scenarios. The
cost of the current paradigm is used as reference, and the savings from
HVDC EPC are compared. The position of the marker show what
are the cost savings in case of medium prices, while the marker size
relates to the different price scenarios, e.g. to the range of variation
due to high-low prices. The light blue bars show what is the range of
potential savings for each year. Clearly, there is a substantial economic
benefit from using HVDC for frequency support. Starting from 2018,
Table 3 Low inertia events and HVDC EPC
Scenario Hours (h) Energy (GWh)
2018 166 19
2020
High - -
Medium 260 17
Low 603 47
2025 FN
High - -
Medium 165 11
Low 411 28
2025 HN
High 12 1
Medium 165 31
Low 411 72
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Table 4 Costs: DI reduction (medium-low inertia, median prices)
2018 2020 2025 FN 2025 HN
Medium inertia
Down-regulation (Me) 0.091 0.674 0.294 0.698
Up-regulation (Me) 0.897 4.740 1.661 4.567
Total cost (Me) 0.988 5.414 1.955 5.265
Low inertia
Down-regulation (Me) 0.091 1.871 0.920 2.094
Up-regulation (Me) 0.897 13.563 6.297 15.120
Total cost (Me) 0.988 15.434 7.218 17.214
2018 2020 2025 FN2025 HN
0
5
10
15
C
os
ts
av
in
gs
(M
e
/y
ea
r)
Low inertia Medium inertia High inertia
Fig. 9: Cost savings by using HVDC in the form of EPC for frequency
support.
potential cost savings amount to 0.72 million euros (72.4%). As a
large number of low inertia events is expected in 2020, the potential
cost savings increase to 5.18 million euros per year (reaching 14.80
million euros per year in case of a dry year). Finally, in 2025, savings
are potentially in the range of 1.70-1.78 million euros per year with
the current capacity of nuclear power plants, or in the range of 4.56-
4.78 million euros per year if the capacity of nuclear power plants
is halved (these number will increase to 6.55-6.81 and 15.51-16.16
million euros per year in case of a dry year).
8 Conclusion
During summer 2018, the inertia level of the Nordic Synchronous
Area (NSA) dropped below the security level three times, jeopar-
dizing the N-1 security of the system. To deal with these situations,
Svenska kraftnät ordered the reduction of the power output of Oskar-
shamn 3, a nuclear power plant in Sweden, which is the most critical
generating unit of the Nordic system. The costs associated with this
power limitation for the three instances in 2018 have been calculated
in this paper and amount to 0.988 million euros. Given that more
and more low-inertia periods are expected in the coming years, this
calls for a reassessment of whether there exist more cost-efficient
options which guarantee safe operation while avoiding expensive
redispatching actions.
In this paper, we have presented a decision-making support tool
for comparing different mitigation strategies in case of low inertia
periods. Moreover, we have investigated what is the cost of using
HVDC interconnectors for the provision of frequency support, and
we have performed a cost savings analysis comparing this alternative
to the current paradigm. The analysis is carried out for three scenarios
(2018, 2020, 2025), using historical data from Nord Pool and inertia
estimations from Nordic TSOs. The cost of the remedial actions are
calculated based on historical data from the past 5 years, considering
the distribution of the average price obtained via data re-sampling.
Our results show that, if HVDC was used in the form of Emergency
Power Control, the costs in 2018 could be reduced to 0.27 million
euro. The extension of the analysis to year 2020 and 2025 confirms
that many more low-inertia periods can be expected in the future,
Table 5 Costs: HVDC EPC (medium-low inertia, median prices)
2018 2020 2025 FN 2025 HN
Medium inertia
HVDC capacity (Me) 0.048 0.152 0.098 0.278
Primary reserves (Me) 0.225 0.172 0.111 0.314
Total cost (Me) 0.273 0.324 0.210 0.592
Low inertia
HVDC capacity (Me) 0.048 0.421 0.251 0.645
Primary reserves (Me) 0.225 0.476 0.284 0.730
Total cost (Me) 0.273 0.897 0.534 1.374
calling for more redispatching actions. In this regard, the method
proposed in this paper would reduce the costs by 70%, resulting in
cost savings in the range of 1.70-4.78 million euros per year by 2025
(or even higher if dry years are to be expected).
Although the focus of the paper is on the utilization of HVDC lines
for frequency support, other mitigation strategies can be compared
following the same approach. For instance, a new product - Fast
Frequency Reserves (FRR) - will become available for Nordic TSOs
starting from summer 2020. According to the availability of market
data, the proposed tool can be used to compare the new product to
the already analyzed measures.
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